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ABSTRACT
JOHN L. LOVETT JR.: Explaining Changes in the Spread of Congressional Committee
Jurisdictions
(Under the direction of Frank R. Baumgartner.)
Following the end of World War II, the United States government began to increase its involve-
ment in domestic and non-military issues, responding to the needs of a country changing in
terms of population growth and economic focus, which it primarily did through an increase in
the number of agencies and bodies dealing with issue areas. The Congressional committee sys-
tem, on the other hand, followed a different path, as Congress has responded to increases in the
federal government’s involvement in issue areas by allowing committees to become involved in
more issues that are outside of its primary jurisdiction areas, with increase in diversity occurring
over time. Using an analysis of entropy scores, which measure jurisdictional diversity, I show
that increases in the size of government result in Congressional committees increasing their own
jurisdictional diversity, increasing the number of issues individual committees are involved in.
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Introduction
Following the end of World War II, the United States government began to increase its
involvement in domestic and non-military issues, responding to the needs of a country changing
in terms of population growth and economic focus. Though the government had begun to become
involved in the economic livelihoods of Americans during the Great Depression, the post-War
period saw the rise of government projects and programs designed to help reconstitute the
American economy and deal with new issues that appeared in the post-War era. The projects
and programs vary from expansive, such as the creation of the highway system under Eisenhower
or the creation of Medicare, to smaller domestic programs on new issues, yet all were vastly
different than spending in the pre-Depression period.
As the government deals with an increasing number of issues and programs under its purview,
different levels of government need to respond with systems that can adapt to an increased
diversity of issues. One possible way to deal with an increase is to add structures to a system,
such as government agencies or new groups, expanding government by expanding the number of
structures in government.1
By contrast, the United States Congress and its primary organizational system, the committee
system, has not followed a similar path to deal with an increase in issues. Few committees have
been added since the 1947 Legislative Reorganization Act, when the system was consolidated
down to a small set of about 20 committees per house of Congress. Instead, as I will argue,
Congress has responded to increases in the federal government’s involvement in issue areas by
allowing committees to become involved in more issues that are outside of its primary jurisdiction
areas. By doing this, committees help Congress stay on top of a variety of issues, spreading the
wealth of issues while also ensuring that issues are not ignored due to a lack of available committee
space.
This is not to say that committees are not unique from one another. While committees
continue to have well-defined jurisdictions as enumerated within the rules of Congress, committee
chairs and members can use their powers to call hearings outside the enumerated jurisdiction
areas in an attempt to claim jurisdiction over a new or newly defined issue. This would increase
the spread of issues heard by committees. By doing this, members further their own prospects
1 Stevenson (1986) notes that the response from civic bureaucracy to demanded changes was increases in
structures in civic governments over time.
while also helping deal with the increase in the number of new issues.
In order to explain how the growth of government affects congressional organization, I will
present a theory behind Congress’ desire to increase issue overlap by breaking down two compo-
nents, the first of which is the general motivations that are enumerated in the need by Congress
to adapt to a new issue environment and respond to increases in the government’s involvement
in areas. The general motivations of division of labor will work in concert with an individual
theory where members, who in many cases would check an extreme committee from overreaching
outside of its jurisdictions, instead allow and facilitate committee overlap across issues to maxi-
mize member interests. Through these two motivations, I outline a theory where members allow
committees to work outside of their enumerated jurisdictions to ensure issues receive attention.
To test the effect of government growth on the issue overlap of congressional committees, I
focus on a dataset of committee hearings from the 80th Congress (1947-1948) to the 109th (2005-
2006). To represent growth of government, I will focus on a measure of the growth of government
that members of Congress are directly involved in: the federal budget. I will break down other
potential measures of government growth, such as the number of government employees and
government agencies, but the budget’s particular importance can be found in its relation to
members of Congress: members set the funding for issues in the previous year for the Fiscal
Year in question, and therefore would know to respond to that funding with hearings. In both
cases, rather than using raw numbers, I instead calculate a measure of entropy, which will
measure the number of issues committees take on by Congress. By using entropy, I can focus on
how this spread changes by committee over time.
A Word on Entropy
Before I begin to break down how growth of government affects the United States Congress,
I will briefly explain the concept of entropy and spread, and how increases in spread will be
measured. For both hearings and the budget, I calculate entropy scores to measure the spread
of hearings and spending across all topics for each congress.2 Like other measures such as
the Herfhendal Index, entropy uses the percent of the total number of hearings in each topic to
assess the spread of hearings across topics. The more spread out hearings are, the higher the
entropy score. I use entropy because of its comparability in regression analysis; it is a measure
of increasing spread rather than decreasing diversity (as in the case of the Herfhendal Index),
positive and significant changes from a specific coefficient on a variable in a regression model
will correspond to an increase in committee spread.
2 Budget Entropy is calculated for each year, and averaged for each two year period to make comparable to
congressional hearing data.
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However, the measure is more nuanced, as spread does not follow a linear path. When a
committee holds a hearing in a new topic, it will have more power on entropy if entropy is very
low. On the other hand, if entropy is very high, adding a hearing to a new topic will have
much smaller effects. To illustrate this, I created a series of hypothetical committees, all with
100 hearings and 19 topic areas, which can be found in Tables 1 and 2, with committees A-K
in Table 1, and committees L through S in Table 2. Committee A only hears hearings in one
topic, with the number of topics committees hear increasing in each committee, culminating with
Committee S, which holds hearings in all 19 topic areas.
Table 1: Hypothetical Committee Jurisdictional Spreads and Entropy Scores (A to K)
Topic A B C D E F G H I J K
1 100 60 55 30 25 22 20 18 15 14 12
2 0 40 25 25 22 20 20 15 12 13 11
3 0 0 20 25 20 18 16 14 12 12 10
4 0 0 0 20 18 15 14 13 11 11 10
5 0 0 0 0 15 13 14 12 11 10 10
6 0 0 0 0 0 12 12 12 11 10 9
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 10 9 9
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 9 8 8
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 7 7
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Entropy 0.000 0.229 0.338 0.467 0.542 0.600 0.635 0.695 0.742 0.772 0.809
Rows represent issue topics in hypothetical committee spread.
Colums represent hypothetical committees, with committees ascending in number of topics heard
by committee.
(A=1, B=2, etc. to S=19)
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Table 2: Hypothetical Committee Jurisdictional Spreads and Entropy Scores (L to S)
Topic L M N O P Q R S
1 15 15 12 7 7 6 6 6
2 10 15 10 7 7 6 6 6
3 9 10 9 7 7 6 6 6
4 9 10 9 7 7 6 6 6
5 8 10 8 7 6 6 6 6
6 8 5 7 7 6 6 6 5
7 8 5 7 7 6 6 6 5
8 8 5 7 7 6 6 6 5
9 8 5 7 7 6 6 6 5
10 8 5 5 7 6 6 6 5
11 8 5 5 6 6 6 5 5
12 1 5 5 6 6 6 5 5
13 0 5 5 6 6 6 5 5
14 0 0 4 6 6 6 5 5
15 0 0 0 6 6 6 5 5
16 0 0 0 0 6 5 5 5
17 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5
18 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5
19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Entropy 0.818 0.835 0.881 0.919 0.941 0.962 0.980 0.999
Rows represent issue topics in hypothetical committee spread.
Colums represent hypothetical committees, with committees ascending in number of topics heard
by committee.
(A=1, B=2, etc. to S=19)
Committee entropy starts out at zero as expected when all hearings are held in one topic, as
seen in Committee A. Here, there is absolutely no spread whatsoever. There is a sizable jump
when topics are heard in two topic areas, as seen in Committee B.3 As more topics receive
hearings, the effect that an individual hearing has on entropy diminishes. The measure reaches
0.6 after spreading between 6 committees, and at the very end of the series of committees shows
smaller growth, with the addition of the final five topics (and an increased spread of about 25
hearings across those five topics) adding only about 0.1 to the entropy score.
Entropy then is a measure that primarily captures the movement of interest into new areas,
while also taking into account the general spread across areas. A committee or budget that
focuses on one area will have a low entropy, while one that spreads out into more and more
areas will have higher entropy. However, as entropy increases, the power of the addition of new
interests decreases, leading to a leveling off of entropy as the spread approaches 1. I will use this
measure to capture how spread increases.
3 This jump does vary on the number of hearings held: an addition of one hearing alone increases entropy by
about 0.02, while the movement in my table is 0.23 for a more even spread between the first two topics.
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Congressional Committees in Historical Context
The modern committee system has only come to fruition in the last 60 years, the result
of changes designed to move away from earlier systems that emphasized the decentralization of
committee chair power at the expense of committee parsimony and stable jurisdictions. Following
the Civil War, congressional committees were numerous, a move leadership used to keep current
chairs from becoming too powerful in the caucus.4 This system remained in place until the end
of World War I, with the number of standing committees reaching peaks of 73 in the Senate and
60 in the House (Smith and Deering 1990). Reformers began to dwindle the number of standing
committees in the 1920s, with the most significant action occurring in 1946 with passage of the
Legislative Reorganization Act. The Act, designed primarily to help Congress deal with the
workload that had developed due to reforms in the Great Depression, significantly changed the
nature of congressional committees, decreasing its numbers while also shifting jurisdictions on
issues and giving committees clear distinctiveness on jurisdictions (Smith and Deering 1990).
The results of the reorganization of committees was a decrease in the constant addition of
committees to deal with new issues, and the rise of both strong committee chairs and subcom-
mittee government (Smith and Deering 1990). The new committee system was constant: with a
few exceptions (such as Science and Astronautics in 1959, Budget in 1975 as part of the Budget
Reform Act, and Homeland Security in 2003 following the 9/11 attacks), permanent committees
have not been added to the House and Senate rolls, with special committees taking on a small
amount of the committee load to deal with special issues. This does potentially lead to problems
in information processing: groups can only take on so much information before responding to it
in a disproportionate fashion (Jones and Baumgartner 2005).
With the committee system remaining generally constant over the last 60 years, committees
began to develop specificity and distinctiveness. Richard Fenno’s seminal work Committees in
Congress (Fenno 1973) outlines the distinctiveness that developed across committees, offering the
singular assumption that committees are different, and that they are different because of both the
member goals that guided the committee, and the environmental constraints that characterized
the actions and responses to committee action. The notion that committees are different is key:
they have specific goals and aims that are set by both the environment that they reside in and
the needs of members.
To emphasize the differences between committees, Fenno breaks committees down into three
groups based on the outside groups whom committee policy is primarily directed toward: other
4 Smith and Deering (1990) note that most committees in this period were created in order to keep new issues
away from current committee chairs and older members, in an attempt to consolidate party power.
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members of Congress (e.g. Appropriations, Ways & Means); interest groups (e.g. Foreign Affairs,
Education and Labor); and district constituents (e.g. Postal Service, Interior). Each group of
committees is defined by what the outside environment needs from its committee and acts in
terms of those needs. The distinctiveness is a function of outputs and the group served by the
policy created within different types of committees. The differences do not necessarily lead to
constant policy over time, as changing agendas and rules (especially the economic policy agenda)
can change a committee’s makeup and politics (Davidson 1986; Strahan 1988). Meanwhile, others
have expanded on Fenno’s notions of committee differences, updating committee environments
due to the postreform House (Davidson 1986) and reconceptualizing environment as related
to specific issues as opposed to committees (Price 1978). What Fenno does tell us is that
committees are distinct, and that different types of committees will have different needs in mind
when creating policy.
Development of Jurisdictions
While committees have developed distinctiveness from one another, committee jurisdictions
have diversified, with congressional committees becoming involved in more topics over time. The
reasons behind this are varied. Demand for policy from external sources may have an effect on
jurisdiction spread when issues are more salient (Hardin 1998). Furthermore, the ability to pass
policy is not necessarily affected by the change in jurisdiction, as usually only members of the
committee who loses jurisdiction on an issue will be affected by the results of a turf war (Shipan
1996). As a result, jurisdiction battles are viable options for committees.
More generally, Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod (2000) look at the main reasons behind
changes in issue jurisdictions throughout the period following the establishment of the modern
committee system. Using a time series analysis of Congressional hearings, they analyze the extent
of both jurisdictional overlap (the amount of spread among committees) and jurisdictional span
(the number of issues that a committee has within its jurisdiction), finding that clarity in issue
concentration has decreased over time as diversity of issues heard by individual committees
has increased. They argue that the reasons behind this are a combination of two forces, the
redefinition of old issues and the development of newer issues that receive attention in the
congressional agenda.
Where new and old issues appear is more complicated. The emergence of new issues fall
under common law jurisdictions through assignment of issues in bills from the referral process
(King 1997).5 Here, the referral process is key to giving committees jurisdictional oversight over
5 Jones (1975) outlines a specific case of jurisdictional battle within air pollution legislation between the House,
Senate, and the President, showing that turf battles go even beyond committees to branch disputes over policy-
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new issues, setting precedent that guides issue jurisdiction battles in the future. New issues are
also more likely to be taken on by committees with larger jurisdictions (Sheingate 2006), where
a more diverse jurisdiction can justify movement into new areas.
For older issues, issue development and the collapse of policy monopolies contributed to
changes in issue frames (Baumgartner and Jones 2009), leading to shifts in issue jurisdictions as
specific issue areas received new frames. As issue frames change, committee jurisdictions also
shift, leading to new claims over older issues by committees that now better fit the issue.
The movement of old issues and the emergence of new issues help guide jurisdictional change
between committees. However, this does not help explain why jurisdictions would move so
significantly over time. New and old issues appear all the time, with old issues simply increasing
one committee’s spread while taking away from another, and new issues would simply settle in
generally to what eventually becomes their primary committee of jurisdiction. To understand
how jurisdictions may be shifting more generally, it is appropriate to look at the mechanisms
behind jurisdiction change, primarily committee hearings.
Committee Hearings
As the mechanism that I focus upon for entropy, the calling of congressional hearings drives
committee spread across specific issues. Understanding the motivations behind calling a hearing
in a specific policy area will help clarify issues in jurisdictions. Committee chairs have the primary
onus of calling hearings and therefore are central to the question of jurisdictional change, though
individual members have say in this process as well.
Two forces drive the calling of specific hearings: hearings can be called as the result of
the referral of a bill to a congressional committee, and those that called outside of the referral
process. The differences between the two are not trivial: hearings called due to a referral set
common law precedence for jurisdictional battles (King 1997), while non-referral hearings are
more variant, with research showing that non-referral hearings are more likely to be used to
follow issues outside of committee jurisdiction (Hardin 1998).
Committees call non-legislative hearings for a variety of reasons. One main reason conceives
congressional hearings as part of the committee role in obtaining information (Oleszek 2011;
Smith and Deering 1990). For the members on the committee, information from committee
hearings allow individuals to become information experts, and to be able to transmit information
to non-informed members on the floor(Krehbiel 1991). While some research has shown this
information to be biased based on committee jurisdiction (Jones, Baumgartner, and Talbert
making.
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1993), this information can be transmitted regardless of the extremity of the committee in
question (Diermeier and Feddersen 2000), meaning that all committees have some incentive to
seek information via hearings that may shape debate on the floor.
While chairs are the primary movers on congressional hearings, individual members also
have motivations to either call hearings or have hearings called in areas outside of the traditional
committee jurisdiction. Given that members are primarily concerned with their own re-election
prospects (Mayhew 1974), they will want to seek out policy and funding that best benefits their
district’s interests. While members are eventually successful at getting on to committees that fit
their primary interests (Shepsle 1978), this is not an immediate process as freshmen members
must usually wait to get preferred committees. Therefore, members should be looking for ways
to work in their district’s preferred areas, regardless of committee assignment.
For individual members then, information is not a main component of their prospects. While
information does help issues when they reach the floor, it does not explain the costs and bene-
fits individual members receive from increased committee spread. The distributive function of
Congress and its institutions may have a better answer to individual motivation. Following the
assumption that committees are constructed and used in terms of the membership firm construc-
tion as outlined for vote trading by Weingast and Marshall (1988), then the assumption can be
made that committee hearings can be used to minimize costs on gains of trade and maximize
benefits for individual members. As a result, members can try to receive funding that will help
maximize their re-election prospects. This is not a stretch, especially considering members of
Congress have used their committee positions to direct disproportionate funding in the direction
of their districts (Alvarez and Saving 1997). Individual members would then support jurisdiction
spread as a way of maximizing their own piece of the funding pie, in order to get at funding
for issues that will help their re-election prospects, without having to be on the committee of
record.
However, there are controls against extensive jurisdictional turf-grabbing. For the committee
of jurisdiction itself, they have the advantage of the ex-post veto, the committee’s ability to
overrule the floor (or other committees looking to legislate on this issue) at the Conference
committee level (Shepsle and Weingast 1987). The party, both in caucus and leadership form,
can also help legislate jurisdictional battles, and in some cases punish committees that step too
far outside of their bounds (Rohde 1991).
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Attention and Hearings
While members’ desires to maximize the payoffs that their districts receive through the
cost-reducing committee system will motivate jurisdictional shifts, member actions may also be
occurring due to the increased load that the government has taken on over the last 60 years.
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 was primarily concerned with the organization of
government, rooting out inefficiency in the committee system by streamlining information and
topics. However, Congress may have reached a point where this division of labor may not be
enough. Cognitive limitations may be facilitating movement in jurisdictions: committees take
on more simply because the current system, while a good fix for the Great Depression, was never
set up to deal with the sheer number of issues that Congress deals with today.
At the same time, individual members of Congress have incentive to expand jurisdictions:
to seek out increased prominence in legislating their favored topic areas if they do not currently
have membership on a committee with direct jurisdiction. Yet members also need some sort of
impetus to facilitate movement into new topic areas. Information does not give us an answer,
yet distribution of money, in the form of the federal budget, may have a more acceptable answer
for jurisdictional spread in committees.
Member desires for funding and the division of labor are not mutually exclusive and are both
plausible: members will seek out new funding sources to maximize their chances at re-election,
and the division of labor will begin to break down as more and more issues are added to the
system. The two can work together to create the jurisdictional spreads seen today. However,
they both need a spark, a justification for movement and labor breakdowns. That can be found in
the federal budget, where increased spread of spending will move money into new areas, not only
priming individual members to get their hands on the pot, but also contributing to stretching
the cognitive limitations of the current committee system.
The government has grown significantly since the end of World War II, with the total amount
of money allocated increasing over the post-war period to over 3.5 trillion dollars by FY2009.
More importantly, this spending has not been confined to defense, which drove spending during
World War II and the Korean War. The amount of spending in non-defense priorities has
increased significantly, with this spending spreading out more diversely across the federal budget.
As a result, the United States government has become involved in more issue areas, and more
money is available for members to bring back to their districts. With this increase in budget
spread, there has been a need to increase the spread of oversight, as well as a need to account
for newer issues that have entered government jurisdiction.
One major focus of the United States Congress is this dispersal of funds through the federal
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budget. With over 40% of the budget amenable as domestic discretionary spending (Oleszek
2011)6 , individual members have incentive to affect budget spending and its potential oversight-
based outputs in those areas where they can cause changes in the dispersal of funds. The
distributive effects are important. With the appearance of new funding, members can justify
holding congressional hearings as a mechanism to get at this funding. Even if unsuccessful, it is
an attempt to assert jurisdiction and potentially establish future jurisdiction to facilitate future
funding.
With expanding budget funds, there are two ways the United States Congress could organize
to spread out their resources and maximize benefits for all members. The first, an increase in
standing committees, has not occurred. The United States Congress, while increasing committee
staffs, has not significantly increased the number of committees as they did in the post-Civil War
period, instead sticking to a generally constant set of committees, with some variation due to
new permanent committees like Space and Aeronautics or special committees.
If Congress has not created new committees to deal with the increased available spread of
funding, then they must spread their current organization out to deal with demand. Rather
than create new committees for each issue, committees have become more diverse in issue scope,
wading into more and more issues while protecting their own turf from other committees and
gaining jurisdiction over allocating funds to their own interest areas. The creation of more topics
has given committees justification to find ways to spread out into more topics, and therefore shift
the jurisdiction of committees.
Keeping this in mind, I hypothesize that
H1: Increases in the diversity of the United States federal budget will result in increases in
committee jurisdictional spread.
As diversity in the budget increases, so should diversity within congressional committees.
Members should generally want to increase spread to get at funds that are now receiving more
funds as a result of the spread across the budget. Why they get there is likely due to the division
of labor, both in terms of cognitive limitations (the lack of resources necessary for one committee
to deal with all aspects of a single issue topic area) as well as a desire of individual members to
effectively get at newly available funds in new issue areas.
6 The other 60% of the budget is primarily composed of defense functions, Medicare, and Social Security
functions, as well as miscellaneous trust fund functions and financial functions.
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Data and Model
To explore committees and budget data, I employ hearings and budget data from the Policy
Agendas Project.7 The hearings data covers all individual full committee hearings from the 80th
Congress to the 109th Congress (1947-2006), broken down by the primary committee involved
and the topic as designated by the Policy Agenda Project.8 Committee-Congress cells that have
under 5 total hearings are dropped, and only standing committees are used in analysis.9 I make
the assumption that Policy Agendas codes represent specific topics, for purposes of analysis.
To represent the growth of government, I use data from the federal budget. I use the budget
dataset from the Policy Agendas website, which outlines spending across 92 budget subfunctions
between FY1947 and FY2006. I drop all financial subfunctions and trust fund functions and
then focus primarily on domestic discretionary spending to test the portion of the budget that
can be affected by member actions on spending. This calculation of budget excludes mandatory
functions like Medicare and Social Security which members have less control over.10 The budget
numbers are in adjusted FY2008 dollars for comparability. The resulting budget dataset offers
a test of entropy across 40 budget subfunctions over a period of 30 congresses (corresponding
with the congresses available).11
The budget is just one of many potential measures for the growth of government, though
it has the added advantage for this analysis in that Congress is directly involved in setting the
budget numbers (especially in terms of the anticipation of available funding for the following
year). Furthermore, the budget acts similarly to measures of government growth such as federal
employment numbers and the number of government agencies. For federal employment, the
domestic discretionary portion of the federal budget is strongly correlated with both the total
number of federal government workers12 (0.79) and the total number of civilian Executive
Branch employees13 (0.92). The budget is also strongly correlated with the total number of
7 Data available at http://www.policyagendas.org.
8 Issues are broken down into 19 different policy areas, from macroeconomic issues to water and land issues,
among others. For more information on specific topics, see http://www.policyagendas.org/page/topic-codebook.
A full list of Policy Agendas Topics used is in Appendix A.
9 I drop some committees due to the lack of a series created, due either to time or the number of hearings held.
These committees are the House Administration Committee, House Rules Committee, and the House Homeland
Security Committee.
10 I have also run tests on the full budget excluding financial functions and trust funds, and the spread of the
two budget numbers correlate at 0.94.
11 Please see Appendix A for budget subfunction topic numbers and names for the Domestic Discretionary
portion of the federal budget.
12 Federal government worker numbers for 1947-1999 from Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest
Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, Table Ea827-Ea869, Column Ea828.
13 Civilian Executive Branch data from Office of Personnel Management, and is available at
http://www.opm.gov/feddata/HistoricalTables/ExecutiveBranchSince1940.asp.
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federal government agencies,14 with a correlation of 0.93. Considering the similarities between
the movement of different government indicators including the domestic discretioanry portion of
the budget, the budget data will work well as a measure for the growth of government.
Entropy Data: Congress and Budget
The pathways of congressional and budget entropy follow similar paths, though the two work
on both different scales of measure (the congressional measure is based on 19 topics; the budget
measure is based on 40 subfunctions) as well as different levels of entropy. congressional entropy
is represented in Figure 1 below as mean entropy across all standing committees15 from the
80th to the 109th Congresses.
Fig. 1: House and Senate Average Entropy Scores
The average entropy scores for both bodies range between around 0.35 (during the Korean
War, when most attention went to defense issues) and around 0.60 (the House in the 105th
Congress). One important thing to note is that the two series follow similar paths throughout
their series, with some slight differences at different times. Both House and Senate entropy follow
generally upward trends for the most of the series, though there are levels where movement
plateaus, especially between the 95th and 104th Congresses. At the 104th Congress, both House
and Senate jurisdiction spreads reach low points in the post-94th Congress period (with the
14 Government agency data compiled by David Lewis, primarily from The United States Government Manual.
15 This includes committees dropped for my analysis, though these would have little effect on the total mean
for each series, and the Senate series would remain the same as no Senate committees were dropped, as all Senate
committees had sufficient series for analysis.
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House leveling off here and the Senate dropping), though both begin to increase in the 105th
Congress, with the House climbing greatly in the 106th. By the end of the series, entropy
has dropped off in both series, though it remains higher than it was in the modern committee
system’s nascent stages.
Budget entropy is generally lower than committee entropy. This is for a variety of reasons:
there are more topics to cover in the budget measure than in the committee measure (40 vs.
19), and the spread is also affected by large amounts of spending going into a few categories.
Using the budget calculated in millions of dollars, I calculated entropy scores for the domestic
discretionary portion of the budget, which can be found in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: Domestic Discretionary Budget Entropy Scores
Similar to the trends of entropy for the House and Senate, budget entropy moves up over time,
hitting a plateau around the 95th Congress after some drop-off. Unlike congressional entropy,
the drop-off does not directly occur in the 104th Congress, instead earlier in the series, with an
increasing spread occurring after the 104th up to its peak around 0.21 at the end of the series,
the 109th Congress.
Both sets of series seem to be trending upwards in the first part of their series, with some
plateau and movement in the 1980s and 1990s. The increases in spread deserve more expansive
study and analysis.
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Model Specifications
To test the relationship between committee spread and budget spread, I have created a pooled
time series, with congress as my time variable across committees. This series is separated by
House and Senate to allow for separate testing of the two bodies, and also contains entropy
scores for each committee by congress, as well as entropy scores for the budget broken down by
congress.
Rather than use the direct House and Senate committee entropy measures as my variable
for committee spread, I use a measure that takes into account the possibility that the number
of hearings may have a positive effect on committee spread. There is the possibility that when
committees increase their hearings, they will have more room to increase hearings in more and
more areas and thereby increasing their spread simply out of convenience. While the correlation
between the number of hearings for each committee by congress is only about 0.36, the correlation
is about 0.71 for prestige committee hearings.16 Therefore, in order to keep potential hearing
correlations issues in check, I use the alternative measure.
To account for the potential hearing number problems, I run a two-stage analysis. In the
first stage of the model, I use OLS estimation to regress the total number of hearings and the
total hearings squared on the committee entropy scores, capturing the residuals to find the
differences between the estimated values and actual values when the total is taken into account.
For the second stage, I take the residuals created from the first stage, and use the residuals
as the adjusted hearings entropy to estimate the effect of Budget Entropy, while also modeling
the effect of the number of hearings on congressional entropy.17 The residual measure, unlike
the unadjusted entropy, decreases the trend within the entropy score, which may help protect
against potential spuriousness. 18
To test this adjusted entropy, I have specified a fixed effects OLS regression19 with domestic
discretionary budget entropy as the main independent variable. I use fixed effects here because
unit effects are present, but I am not concerned with cross-sectional variance at this stage of the
analysis. The results here will be for what could be constituted as the general mean committee.
16 I define prestige committees as the House Appropriations Committee, House Budget Committee, Ways &
Means Committee, Senate Appropriations Committee, Senate Budget Committee, and Senate Rules and Ad-
ministration Committee. I define prestige committees as those most similar to Fenno’s congressmen-focused
committees: those committees that deal with areas whose outputs are watched by other members of Congress.
17 See Appendix B for estimations of the model using the original unaltered entropy scores, though it should be
noted that these results are tainted by potentially spurious results due to trend-on-trend testing.
18 See Appendix D for a comparison between the House unadjusted entropy scores and the adjusted resiudals.
19 Though the entropy scores are not linear themselves, taking on the assumptions of OLS is a preferable option
to other methods, such as a logistic regression which would make the assumption that the data is either 0 or 1.
A Beta regression may be appropriate considering that the main dependent variable takes on a 0-1 scale, though
multiplying the coefficients by 100 would fix these concerns as well. As the model stands, I keep the variable as
a 0-1 variable and run OLS regression.
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Capturing this mean committee should give a good sense of the general effect budget entropy is
having on the spread of congressional committees. The model I use is below:
Adjusted Hearings Entropy = β0 + β1 * Budget Entropy + β2 * Adjusted Hear-
ings Entropyt−1+β3 * 94th Congress + β4 * 104th Congress + β5 * Post-104th
Congress Counter + e
The residuals estimated from the first stage of my two stage model will be the primary
dependent variable in the second stage, taking into account total hearings. There is also a
lagged dependent variable to deal with any first order autocorrelation effects. Budget Entropy
refers to domestic discretionary budget entropy for each congress, and is the main independent
variable under consideration in this stage.
I have also controlled effects created by two congresses where significant congressional com-
mittee change occurs. The 94th Congress is controlled for a variety of reasons, some due to the
effects of the 1974 Budget Reform Act. The changes include the establishment of the Budget
Committee, the dissolution of the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the jurisdic-
tion change on committee assignments from Ways & Means to Steering and Policy. One reform
that may have had significant effects on jurisdictional spread during the 94th Congress is the
establishment of the multiple referral system, which due to its establishment as norm the sending
of bills to multiple committees may be having an effect on committee jurisdictions. While the
Policy Agendas data does not control for whether the hearing is the result of a multiple referral,
I would assume that the appearance of the multiple referral may have some effect on the increase
in jurisdiction spread. I therefore code the 94th Congress dummy as an intervention: 0 before
the 94th Congress, 1 at the 94th and thereafter.
The other congress I control for is the 104th Congress, the first with joint House and Senate
control by Republicans since the 83rd Congress in 1953-1954. I control here for the contraction of
three committees: the District of Columbia, Merchant Marines & Fisheries, and the Postal Ser-
vice committees. Furthermore, there is a significant drop-off in committee entropy in the 104th
Congress in the Senate (with a leveling off in the House), which recovers almost immediately
afterward in the 105th Senate. However, I make the assumption that the 104th Congress is a
prolonged pulse, because of the potential after-effects that may come from both the appearance
of totally new leadership that will need time to adjust, as well as the adaption of committees to
added jurisdictions that came from contraction. To model this I use two variables: the first is a
simple pulse variable where the 104th Congress receives a 1, and all other congresses receive a
zero. The second is a counter variable starting at the 105th Congress and ending at the 109th
Congress, ranging from 1 to 5. If there is decay, there will be a negative and significant coefficient
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on the counter, as the effects from being after the 104th Congress fade.
In both the House and Senate models, I expect the Budget Entropy coefficient to be positive
and significant, affecting committee entropy in the adjusted form taking into account the total
number of hearings. When the spread of the budget increases, the spread of congressional
committees should also increase, as members and chairs expand jurisdictions to deal with labor
issues and work to maximize funds in topics relevant to their districts.
Results
Models of Budget Entropy
Taking the residuals from the first stage model20 , I used fixed effects regression on the residual
results. My analysis in this stage focuses on the effect of the entropy scores for the domestic
discretionary portion of the federal budget on the residuals. The results of the regression are in
Table 3.
Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression on Adjusted Hearings Entropy
Variable House Senate
Budget Entropy 0.34 (0.15)* 0.84 (0.16)*
Adj. Hearings Entropyt−1 0.34 (0.04)* 0.23 (0.05)*
94th Congress 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02)
104th Congress -0.04 (0.02) -0.08 (0.02)*
Post-104th Counter -0.01 (0.00)* -0.02 (0.00)*
Intercept -0.02 (0.01)* -0.08 (0.01)*
N 522 454
R2 overall 0.60 0.53
Note: Coefficients are presented with standard errors in the
parentheses. * = significant at 0.05, two-tailed test.
The results confirm my hypothetical expectations: controlling for variation in congresses,
the coefficient for the spread of the federal budget controlling for total number of hearings is
significant and positive on both House and Senate entropy.21 The 94th Congress coefficient is
not significant for both the House and Senate, an interesting development especially in the House
considering the effects from the emergence of the Budget Committee and the Budget Reform
Act.
The 104th Congress pulse coefficient is significant at 0.95 for the Senate, but not the House.22
This is not surprising for the Senate considering that the Senate’s drop in the 104th is particularly
20 First stage estimates that are used in the second stage analysis can be found in Appendix C.
21 This is also true for unadjusted entropy, which can be found in the Appendix. I also tested the reverse
causality (that committee entropy is causing budget entropy. The results were non-significant for both the House
and Senate.
22 The coefficient is significant in the House at 0.90.
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powerful. The post-104th counter is, as expected, significant and negative for both the House
and Senate. The significance of the House is interesting; while the decay is significant, the actual
pulse is not, meaning that the decay could potentially be coming from another source. Referring
back to Figure 1, we can see that the entropy decrease in the House in the 104th Congress is
followed by a huge spike and a drop-off toward the end of the series, while the Senate’s change
is less pronounced in this period. There is the potential that there may be something here of
interest beyond the currently specified model.
That being said, there are interesting effects in the two models, where the spread of commit-
tees seems to be driven by the spread of the controllable portion of the federal budget, controlling
for variation in specific congresses.
A Few Words on Fenno
While I have established the importance of the spread of the budget on the spread of con-
gressional committees in the House and Senate, it is important to see whether movement in the
House23 is occurring as the result of specific types of committees. To do this, I will apply (Fenno
1973)’s classifications, with some alterations, to my entropy data to see whether jurisdictions are
changing in specific types of committees, or all committees in general.
To test Fenno’s committee types, I have classified House committees into three areas: policy
committees, prestige committees, and government administration committees. Unlike Fenno’s
conception of committee differences, I focus more on the primary purpose of the committee
rather than the object of their outputs. Prestige committees are similar to Fenno’s member-based
committees: with Appropriations, Budget, and Ways & Means falling under this classification.
Policy committees are similar to Fenno’s interest group committees, in that there are specific
groups that primarily care about the outputs created by the committee. This category is vast,
and will contain many of the remaining committees. The government administration committees
covers those committees not covered by the first two, and corresponds with Fenno’s constituent
category.24
One immediate problem with testing the differences between types of committees in the
House is the status of the government administration committees. Due to lack of hearings and
the removal of committees like House Un-American Activities and Postal Service, there is only
one committee with sufficient hearings for analysis by the end of the series in the House: House
23 I do not analyze the Senate, because there are not enough government administration or prestige committees
under my classification to create an average in all congresses.
24 One committee that does not correspond to Fenno’s coding is the Resources Committee, formerly the Interior
Committee. While it does continue to do constituent-related services, including management of the National
Park System, it is also involved in environmental and energy-related issues, including conservation. A full list of
categories and the committees that are in each can be found in Appendix A.
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Oversight and Government Reform. For this reason, I focus my analysis only on the differences
between policy and prestige committees.
To test for differences, I calculated the mean entropy scores for each group by congress, and
then ran an OLS regression regressing the mean scores on time, to capture general trends in the
regressions. Figure 3 captures the the policy and prestige predicted series and their actual mean
entropy scores for the House between the 80th and 109th Congresses. The thicker line represents
the predicted trend from the regression, while the thinner line represents the actual movement
of prestige and policy committees.
Fig. 3: Prestige and Policy Committee Trends, House
The policy trend in the House generally fit the actual values of the distribution, with smaller
residuals, and general movement in the direction implied by the predicted values of entropy.
Prestige committees are more problematic, with the movement of prestige committees being
much more problematic in relation to the estimated trend. Considering that the R2 on the
policy committees is about 0.22 larger than the prestige committees (0.53 versus 0.31), the
differences in strength of estimation are not surprising. All of this being said, there does not
seem to be much difference between the movement in different types of committees over time.
Committee entropy is moving upwards generally, regardless of type of committee.
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Conclusion
As the spread of the federal budget increases, so too does the spread of congressional com-
mittees. Committees spread out into new areas to deal with the division of labor, and committee
members, realizing that there is now more funding available in many areas, call hearings in areas
outside of their committee’s primary jurisdiction as a way to get at this funding and maximize
their chances at re-election.
The difference between the effects on House and Senate are intriguing. While the difference
is not significant, it is large enough to question what differences may be within the Senate as
opposed to the House that would drive more committee spread. It may be that the size of
the bodies has an effect: 100 members should have more incentive to spread less because of
distributive effects and more because of the number of members facilitates the need for more
attention. Senate committees, especially policy committees, are likely more naturally spread
than House committees. With names like ”Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions”, there is
definite potential for naturally large jurisdictions. However, there is upward movement in the
Senate even with committees that have naturally large jurisdictions. In retrospect, I concede
that my theory may do a much better job of explaining movement in the House than the Senate,
due to the focus on members not getting ideal committees and desiring movement in funding to
compensate and credit-claim. A more stringent Senate-focused theory may be appropriate here
as opposed to the one I have proposed to explain jurisdictional change.
It is also interesting that the changes are occurring in more than one type of committee.
One would think that prestige committees are always generally spread out and have no room to
increase, yet they too increase in entropy over time. This does bring up an important point: the
differences between committees are still in place. Committees still hold unique primary jurisdic-
tions, yet have simply expanded their topics out beyond their original purposes. Furthermore,
prestige committees remain more spread out than policy committees, and still deal with different
outputs than policy committees. While policy committees remain concerned with interest group
politics, prestige committees deal in the dispersal matters of money and issues. My theory is
not that the committee system has become hopelessly muddled and overlapping in its nature.
Instead, it is that the committee system is adaptive, changing to deal with more issues and more
available funds.
Going beyond the results, model transformations may be considered in future study. Consid-
ering the model used, there may be other ways to capture the effects and test the model more
effectively. A log transformation on the entropy scores could smooth the curvilinear relationship
that results from the different effects a hearing in a new topic has on the entropy score. This
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transformation could be helpful in explaining the differences in entropy at different levels when
adding hearings, though how to model this in terms of the residual entropy would need more
exploration.
With the uneasy movement in the federal budget culminating in the near-shutdown of the
federal government, members of Congress may not have as much incentive to spread jurisdictions.
Labor decreases, money to spend decreases, and as a result, the spread decreases. However, if
cuts prove to be more uniform, there is the possibility that spread will remain constant, as more
members fight over fewer issues.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Descriptive Data for Congress and Budget Entropy
Table 4: Policy Agendas Topic Codes
Topic Code Topic
1 Macroeconomics
2 Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties
3 Health
4 Agriculture
5 Labor, Employment, and Immigration
6 Education
7 Environment
8 Energy
10 Transportation
12 Law, Crime, and Family Issues
13 Social Welfare
14 Community Development and Housing Issues
15 Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce
16 Defense
17 Space, Science, Technology, and Communications
18 Foreign Trade
19 International Affairs and Foreign Aid
20 Government Operations
21 Public Lands and Water Management
Table 5: Domestic Discretionary Budget Subfunctions
Subfunction Topic
251 General science and basic research
252 Space flight, research, and supporting activities
272 Energy conservation
274 Emergency energy preparedness
276 Energy information, policy, and regulation
301 Water resources
302 Conservation and land management
303 Recreational resources
304 Pollution control and abatement
306 Other natural resources
352 Agricultural research and services
376 Other advancement of commerce
401 Ground transportation
402 Air transportation
403 Water transportation
407 Other transportation
451 Community development
452 Area and regional development
453 Disaster relief and insurance
501 Elementary, secondary, and vocational education
503 Research and general education aids
504 Training and employment
505 Other labor services
506 Social services
552 Health research and training
554 Consumer and occupational health and safety
vii
604 Housing assistance
703 Hospital and medical care for veterans
705 Other veterans benefits and services
751 Federal law enforcement activities
752 Federal litigative and judicial activities
753 Federal correctional activities
754 Criminal justice assistance
801 Legislative functions
802 Executive direction and management
803 Central fiscal operations
804 General property and records management
805 Central personnel management
806 General purpose fiscal assistance
808 Other general government
Table 6: Committee Classification by Type
House
Policy Prestige Govt Administration
Agriculture Appropriations District of Columbia
Armed Services Budget Gov’t Reform and Oversight
Banking and Financial Services Ways & Means Post Office and Civil Service
Education and Labor Un-American Activities
Energy and Commerce
International Relations
Judiciary
Resources
Merchant Marines and Fisheries
Transportation
Science, Space, and Technology
Small Business
Veterans Affairs
Senate
Policy Prestige Govt Administration
Agriculture and Forestry Appropriations Governmental Affairs
Armed Services Budget Post Office and Civil Service
Banking Housing, and Urban Affairs Rules and Administration District of Columbia
Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Energy and Resources
Environment and Public Works
Finance
Foreign Relations
Judiciary
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
Small Business
Veterans Affairs
Aeronautical and Space Sciences
viii
Appendix B: Model Tested with Unadjusted Entropy
Table 7: Fixed Effects Regression on Hearings Entropy
Variable House Senate
Budget Entropy 0.48 (0.15)* 0.97 (0.16)*
Committee Entropyt−1 0.34 (0.04)* 0.22 (0.05)*
94th Congress 0.05 (0.02)* 0.00 (0.02)
104th Congress -0.02 (0.00)* -0.10 (0.02)*
Post-104th Counter -0.02 (0.00)* -0.03 (0.00)*
Intercept 0.26 (0.02)* 0.29 (0.02)*
N 522 454
R2 overall 0.61 0.53
Note: Coefficients are presented with standard errors in
the parentheses. * = significant at 0.05, two-tailed.
Appendix C: First Stage Regression of Entropy on Hearings
Table 8: First Stage Regression on Committee En-
tropy
Variable House Senate
Hearings 0.002 (0.000)* 0.002 (0.000)*
Hearings2 0.000 (0.000)* 0.000 (0.000)*
Intercept 0.370 (0.013)* 0.387 (0.018)*
N 544 476
R2 overall 0.23 0.23
Note: Coefficients are presented with standard
errors in the parentheses. * = significant at
0.05, two-tailed.
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Appendix D: Unadjusted and Adjusted Hearings Entropy, US House
Fig. 4: Unadjusted and Adjusted Hearings Entropy Scores by Congress, House
Figure 4 shows the differences between the adjusted and unadjusted hearings entropy for the
House, with a trend line calculated from a regression of the House numbers for unadjusted and
adjusted entropy by Congress. There are two important things to note here: first, the scales are
different, as the adjusted numbers center around 0, or the predicted difference between the actual
value of entropy and those predicted using only total and total squared in analysis. The second
important consideration is that the upward trend seen in the unadjusted numbers is diminished
in the adjusted numbers. As a result, causality testing is less likely to result in spurious results
that likely occur in a trend-on-trend analysis.
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